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I.INTRODUCTION
In a 2014 episode of Morgan Spurlock: Inside Man,
Academy Award nominee Morgan Spurlock journeys
through the shadowy world of data-brokering.1 The object of
Spurlock’s quest is to learn who is keeping tabs on him, why
they are keeping tabs on him, and, most importantly, what
they know. Through his interview and experiments with
private investigator Steve Rambam and an interview with
Ladar Levison (the sole creator, owner, and operator of
Lavabit, LLC2), Spurlock generates a foreboding portrait of
1. Morgan Spurlock, Inside Man: Privacy (CNN television
broadcast May 4, 2014). About halfway through the episode, Spurlock
observes, “This whole business operates in the shadows. No one will go
on camera and put a face to this faceless industry. I just want answers.”
Id.
2. Edward Snowden had used Lavabit, an
encrypted email service that aimed to protect its users from
compelled production for government investigations. Kashmir
Hill, Lavabit's Ladar Levison: 'If You Knew What I Know About
Email, You Might Not Use It', FORBES.COM (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/08/09/lavabit
s-ladar-levison-if-you-knew-what-i-know-about-email-you-
might-not-use-it/. Levison, who had created the encrypted email
service in 2004,
was concerned that the FBI could send a
company a national security letter . . .
that would force [email service
providers] to turn over information
about a customer without going
through a court first. “I wanted to put
myself in the o of not having
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the data brokering and marketing business. His portrait
reveals how legal boundaries defining personal privacy in
the commercial world have dissolved to mere illusion.
Within the illusion, who the consumers are, what the
commodity is, how the commodity is being packaged and
sold, who is selling it—and why they are selling it—is so
obscured by the ubiquitous presence of marketing
chameleons that people have given up keeping up. The
critical question emerging at the end of the episode concerns
consumer knowledge and consent to electronic surveillance
by data collection companies: “Do [consumers] have a
choice?”3
information to turn over,” he said. “I
didn’t want to be put in the position of
compromising people’s privacy without
due process.” Id.
Levison was forced to shut the business down when the
FBI came knocking on his door for information. Id.
3. Spurlock, supra note 1. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, Lavabit's
Ladar Levison: 'If You Knew What I Know About Email, You Might Not Use
It', FORBES.COM (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/08/09/lavabits-ladar-
levison-if-you-knew-what-i-know-about-email-you-might-not-use-it/. In
her short biography, Senior Online Forbes editor and journalist, Kashmir
Hill, declares, “I have no illusions about privacy.” Id. Her affirmation,
which echoes the perspective of most modern literate people, stands in
noteworthy contrast to Levison’s suggestion (at the end of his interview
with Hill) that he does not presently use email because of the
compromises it involves. Id.
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A data brokerage company CEO answers, “Yes, of
course” (because people can always “opt out,” people can
“opt out of everything”). While there’s little doubt this
option exists, the problem is that people rarely seek to opt
out of something they don’t know they’re already in.
Though consumers generally grasp they are consenting to
another party’s gathering some information about them
during a given transaction, they cannot know the floodgate
of information-sharing they enable each time they “check a
box” to access a desired web page.4
In an August 2013 interview with law and technology
journalist, Kashmir Hill, Spurlock’s interviewee Ladar
Levison pronounced, “I’m taking a break from email. . . .
[and i]f you knew what I know . . . , you might not use it
either.”5 Apple’s chief executive, Tim Cooke, echoed
Levison’s outlook in a February 2015 interview where he
stated that “consumers often don’t fully understand what’s
going on. . . . One day they will, and will be very offended.”6
Spurlock’s private investigator, Steve Ramdam, predicts a
more dramatic public reaction to the depth of data gatherers’
4. Spurlock, supra note 1.
5. Lavabit's Ladar Levison: 'If You Knew What I Know About




6. Allister Heath, Apple Boss: We Have a Human Right to
Privacy, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 27, 2015, 11:55 GMT),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/apple/11441265/Terrorists-
should-be-eliminated-says-Apples-Tim-Cook.html.
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intrusions into consumers’ private affairs. He suggests data
brokerage companies resist sharing with consumers the
information they collect because “first, they don’t want to
establish a precedent. If they give it to [one consumer] . . .
three hundred million Americans would want it, and frankly
there would be a revolution against these ad entities. If
[consumers] knew, the information they had on [them],
[they] would go nuts. There would be a second American
Revolution.”7
Information, defined as “knowledge communicated
concerning some particular fact, subject or event” or “that of
which one is apprised or told[, such as] intelligence [or]
news,”8 always constitutes some manufactured, projected
reflection of reality. The modern world requires that people
produce their personal information for identification
purposes so they can participate in social, economic, and
political activities. After producing information to create an
identity, people use that identity to venture into the
intangible cyber-world to live a large part of their lives.
Personal information often, then, serves to represent and
disseminate people’s tangible reality to the world.
Today’s data gatherers not only collect the
“personally-identifiable information” people produce to
create an acting persona on the internet, they also surveil
and reproduce a reflection of every persona’s experience
while the persona acts on the internet. The aggregated, newly-
7. Spurlock, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
8. See OED ONLINE. Oxford University Press, September
2015. Web. 7 October 2015.
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arranged data becomes a commodity, “capable of being
reduced to money without changing in value, and
completely interchangeable with every other commodity in
terms of exchange value,”9 for marketing companies.
Because we live in a world where our “information”
precedes us, this commodification process—which
implicates the superficial signifiers comprising the identity
(name, date of birth, and social security number) as well as
the individual experiences that develop the identity—
hinders our ability to make autonomous decisions regarding
when, where, and how we engage with the world.
The economic incentive for gathering, arranging,
and sharing practically free-for-all information about
individuals’ lives drives the futile public outcry for more
privacy protection in the virtual domain.10 “There are more
than 1,000 data brokers in the United States, the largest of
whom claim to have detailed data profiles of nearly every
American consumer and household.”11 Personal information
is rarely deemed the property of the individual subject,12 but
9. Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities 3 (1996).
10. Apple executive Tim Cook, for example, has declared
that “privacy is a basic human right.” Heath, supra note 6.
11. Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for
the Misuse of Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 143 (2006).
12. See In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040,
1075 (N.D. Cal. 2012). "The weight of authority holds that a plaintiff’s
‘personal information’ does not constitute property.” Id. (citing Thompson
v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 07cv1058 IEG, 2007 WL 2746603, at *3 (S.D. Cal.
Sept. 18, 2007); In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 713–14
(N.D. Ca. May 12, 2011)).
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it still has an exchange value and can be traded in the open
market. The individual traveling along the virtual highway
is ever-vulnerable to having his data “highjacked” and
rarely travels without paying his dues to the faceless bandits
who stalk him.
Cases of information hijacking have proliferated
along the virtual highway over the last decade with
inconsistent legal results.13 The courts routinely analyze
issues regarding personal-information “appropriation” by
commercial entities—enabled mostly by internet
surveillance—under the Title II of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (also known as the Stored
Communications Act (SCA)).14 The laws reflect principles
promoted by the Supreme Court at a critical mid-century
pivot point in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.15 Inherent
13. See, e.g., In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer
Privacy Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d 434 (D. Del. 2013) (“Plaintiffs [did] not
sufficiently allege[] that the ability to monetize their [PII] [was]
diminished or lost by virtue of Google’s previous collection of it”); Del
Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 11-366, 2012 WL 1997697, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. June 1, 2012) (finding the plaintiffs’ allegations of Amazon’s
“dissemination and use of personal information belonging to [the
plaintiffs], including sensitive information about their web browsing and
shopping habits, purchases, and related transaction information,
combined with their financial information such as credit and debit card
information, and their mailing and billing addresses” sufficient for the
plaintiffs to have standing (emphasis added)).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012). See, e.g., Google, 988 F. Supp. 2d
at 440; In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
15. These principles arise from shifting perspectives of what
individuals can and should expect to remain private outside the context
of property analysis. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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in these principles is the rule that once something is shared,
the law no longer recognizes it as something the individual
has a legitimate interest in keeping private.16 If “legitimate”
privacy expectations determine whether people have the
right to control the dissemination of their personal
information, the third-party doctrine will knock down
appropriation actions just about every time they arise.17 As
Justice Marshall dissented in Smith v Maryland,18 “Unless a
person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has
become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help
but accept the risk of surveillance.”19 Current privacy laws
16. See, e.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. “This Court has held
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining
of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.” Id.
17. See e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp.
2d 497, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[P]laintiffs’ argument is essentially that this
Court should ignore § 2701(c)(2) because Congress failed to take
adequate account of ‘basic property and privacy notions.’ However, it is
not this Court’s role to revisit Congress’ legislative judgments”).
18. 442 U.S. 750 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (critiquing
the Court’s holding that even if a person does entertain a subjective
“expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dial[s], . . . [such an]
expectation [is] not legitimate.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745
(1976). Under the majority’s reasoning, then, “[t]he installation and use
of a pen register . . . was not a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required.” Id.
at 745–46).
19. Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal
citations omitted). “It is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ risks in contexts
where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative.” Id.
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like the SCA give businesses no reason not to sell personal
information about their customers to the highest bidder.
The third-party doctrine practically obliterates
privacy interests in information that has been shared, at any
time, with any one. Hence, Chief Justice Roberts recently
remarked in a relatively lucid moment of insight, “[I]t would
be very unfortunate if privacy protection in the 21st century
were left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt
instrument of the Fourth Amendment.”20 The Chief Justice
never explained the reasoning behind his observation. His
remark implies an at least dim awareness that the “blunt
instrument” provides less protection for individuals against
governmental intrusions than other sources the Court has
consulted (like Webster’s dictionary21) to define the
boundaries of privacy protection against private entities.
Legal recourse premised on property rights for data
brokerage companies’ sale of personal information would
curtail the incessant abuse of “lawful” surveillance by
commercial entities.22 This paper proposes, then, that data
These statements challenge the majority’s reasoning that “individuals
who convey information to third parties have ‘assumed the risk’ of
disclosure to the government.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
20. Riley v. California 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014).
21. See Reporter’s Committee, 489 U.S. at 763–64:
22. See Ludington, supra note 11. “[I]t is currently legal—in
the sense that there is no penalty for data traders to sell personal
information without the consent of the subject, to deny individuals
information about the quantity or categories of lists that contain their
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brokers’ sale of consumer identities— without direct and
explicit consent from the consumer at the point where any
profit might be reaped—should qualify as an unauthorized
interference with the consumers’ identity. Whether the
information signifies a valuable, or profit-bearing, enterprise
to the individual subject matters less than the fact that
almost every individual, by necessity, uses his identity in
basic ways to support his livelihood; in some cases, a
person’s virtual persona functions to support his existence to
a greater extent than his physical body does. When the profit
incentive is removed from the system, businesses will focus
their efforts elsewhere.
The paper examines the Stored Communications Act-
—as exemplary of statutory laws purporting to protect
people’s personal information—to reveal how modern
legislation fails to protect personal information because it
merely echoes Fourth Amendment notions of privacy (and
property). Congress has mistakenly followed the Supreme
Court’s lead in ignoring the essential relationships among
property, privacy, and autonomy. This argument unfolds by
examining cases of information use by entities other than the
subject. It compares constitutional and statutory law with
common law theories of privacy and property, questioning
why Congress would shape laws regulating commercial
trade of personal information from an Orwellian notion of
privacy rather than on models the Court has solidly
legitimized in non-constitutional inquiries. Part II discusses
information, and to deny any requests to remove personal information
from these lists.” Id.
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judicial constructions of privacy under constitutional law as
well as analyses of common law, examining how the SCA
inaptly integrates Fourth Amendment concepts to protect
personal information. Part III examines judicial
constructions of property, explaining that pecuniary
damages requirements impede successful lawsuits brought
on property bases.
II. PRIVACY
Nearly twenty years ago,23 the Court denied a
reporter’s FOIA request for a rap sheet that was a public
record; Justice Stevens observed that the aggregation of
public records in such a fashion would negate the “practical
obscurity” that otherwise protected those records. He noted,
“Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records
that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse
files, county archives, and local police stations throughout
the country and a computerized summary located in a single
clearinghouse of information.”24 The difference incorporates
the immeasurable value—representing the work burden—of
an organic approach to data compilation. Justice Stevens
suggests the work burden imposed by an organic approach
would suffice to mitigate exploitation of personal-data
accessibility. Considered from a privacy-rights perspective,
the opinion may “at first blush” appear arbitrary and
23. Dept. of Justice v. Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
24. Id. at 764.
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“quaint,”25 but “practical obscurity” also explains the
economic incentive for technologically-enabled data trade.
The workload required to produce an accurate
representation of any individual by compiling his personal
information is no longer impractical.
Just five years after Department of Justice v. Reporter’s
Committee for Freedom of the Press, Congress amended the
SCA to become what it is today. It is upon modern judicial
constructions of this statute that consumers watch their
privacy dwindle at the hands of corporate commercial
entities (most of whom they unwittingly “do business
with”). In one landmark case, In re DoubleClick Privacy
25. See Hannah Bergman, Out of Sight, Out of Bounds, THE
NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW 11 (Spring 2009) (quoting Utah’s Judicial
Council in 2004) (remarking,
The most compelling argument against
protecting aggregate compilations of
otherwise public records is the obvious
one: the individual records are public.
This argument, while persuasive at first
blush, ignores the very real benefits of
‘practical obscurity’ that exist when
certain public information is available
only in discrete, individual units, be
they paper or electronic. Practical
obscurity may well turn out to be
nothing more than a quaint, Luddite
notion, but, as things stand today,
practical obscurity helps maintain a
delicate balance between public access
to court records and at least minimal
personal privacy.).
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Litigation, a data gathering service—undetected by internet
users—“record[ed] [their] movements throughout . . .
affiliated Web site[s] . . . [to] learn what information [they]
sought and viewed.”26 When the plaintiffs sued under the
SCA (and other like statutes), the New York district court
declared, “[P]laintiffs’ argument is essentially that this Court
should ignore § 2701(ct)(2) because Congress failed to take
adequate account of ‘basic property and privacy notions.’
However, it is not this Court’s role to revisit Congress’
legislative judgments.”27
A. FOURTH AMENDMENT DERAIL: RIGHTS OF ACCESS
In Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Company28 in
1992, New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Pollock noted
Justice Black’s dissenting opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,29
26. 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
27. See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp.
2d 497, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
28. 129 N.J. 81 (1992) (Pollock, J., concurring). The plaintiff
in Hennessey was challenging his discharge from employment due to the
results of a mandatory drug test. He argued that the drug test violated
what he believed to be his constitutional right to privacy.
29. 381 U.S. 479, 510 n.1 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
“Observing that ‘the right of privacy . . . presses for recognition here,’
today this Court, which I did not understand to have power to sit as a
court of common law, now appears to be exalting a phrase which
Warren and Brandeis used in discussing grounds for tort relief, to the
level of a constitutional rule which prevents state legislatures from
passing any law deemed by this Court to interfere with ‘privacy.’” Id.
Hence, Justice Pollock remarks in Hennessey, “Not finding any specific
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remarking, “As with defamation law, the common-law right
of privacy [was] first adopted, then absorbed by a parallel
constitutional right. Courts have transformed the right,
which was initially conceived as a means for courts to
resolve differences between private parties, into a vehicle to
protect individuals from state action.”30 Justice Pollock’s
observation underscores the ironic transposition of privacy
law and its implications in the constitutional sphere. This
transposition requires scrutiny here because legislatures and
courts consistently regulate the information market by
applying constitutional definitions of privacy.31
Until around mid-century, courts examining Fourth
Amendment issues recognized privacy “rights” as naturally
arising within property boundaries.32 The two-pronged Katz
textual reference to support the right [to privacy] the United States
Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut, placed it
in ‘a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental
intrusion.’” Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81, 110 (1992)
(Pollock, J., concurring) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483
(1965)).
30. 129 N.J. 81, 110 (1992) (Pollock, J., concurring) (referring
to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 n.1 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
31. See, e.g., The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §
2701 (2012). See also Google, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 440; DoubleClick, 154 F.
Supp. 2d 497.
32. See Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy v. Piracy, 7 YALE J. L. & TECH.
222, 233 (2004–05) (citing Jeremy Waldron, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE
PROPERTY 158 (1988)). “[J]ust as every person enjoys a property right in
her person, she enjoys the right to exclude others from treading or
trespassing on her privately owned property. By creating a boundary
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v. United States test centered on “legitimate” privacy
expectations, regardless of any corresponding property
interests. Katz explored the constitutionality of law
enforcement agents’ use of an electronic listening device
outside a telephone booth to obtain recordings of the calls.
The Court dismissed the property analysis, which would
have made the agents’ actions constitutional, and instead
generated an expectations-of-privacy test, which made the
agents’ actions unconstitutional. The resounding echo of
Katz is that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.”33 The Katz test, so embraced by the courts for almost
half a century, was articulated in Justice Harlan’s
concurring:
The inquiry . . . normally embraces two
discrete questions. The first is whether the
individual, by his conduct, has “exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,”34—
whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the
individual has shown that ‘he seeks to preserve
[something] as private.’35 The second question
is whether the individual's subjective
between private and public ownership, the law permits an owner, by
virtue of the right of exclusion, to confer a certain level of privacy on
those objects.” Id. at 235.
33. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–53.
34. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
35. Id. at 740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
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expectation of privacy is “one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable,’ ” . . .
whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the
individual's expectation, viewed objectively, is
“justifiable” under the circumstances.36
The test created an avenue for official application of the
third-party doctrine about ten years later in United States v.
Miller37 and Smith v Maryland.38
Under the third-party doctrine, “[I]ndividuals who
convey information to third parties have ‘assumed the risk’
of disclosure to the government.”39 The doctrine had been
applied in various contexts long before United States v.
Miller, but the Miller Court really sharpened its edges by
imposing assumption of risk on individuals even when they
disclose information they expect would be used only to
36. Id.
37. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
38. 442 U.S. 735 (1976) (holding that even if a person does
entertain a subjective “expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he
dial[s], . . . [such an] expectation [is] not legitimate.”) Under the
majority’s reasoning, “[t]he installation and use of a pen register . . . was
not a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required.” Id. at 745–46.
39. Smith, 442 U.S.at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall laments the majority’s holding as it turns a man’s freedom to
communicate and express himself to others against him, ultimately
inhibiting free expression. See id.
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conduct their personal business with the third party.40 Smith
outlined how the defendant’s privacy expectation in
telephone numbers he dialed was diminished since the
information was, as a by-product of his using the telephone
service, shared with the “third-party” telephone company.
Though the Supreme Court initially invoked the third-party
doctrine as a means to excuse certain governmental
surveillance and collection of personal information from
general Fourth Amendment requisites, the doctrine now
curls its long tendrils into every aspect of commercial
activity.41
40. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (citing United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971). Cf. Reporter’s Committee, 489 U.S. at 767 (noting,
“[O]ur cases have also recognized the privacy interest inherent in the
nondisclosure of certain information even where the information may
have been at one time public.”).
41. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 113 (1967)
(White, J., dissenting) (noting, “Unregulated use of electronic
surveillance devices by law enforcement officials and by private parties
poses a grave threat to the privacy and security of our citizens.”). Earlier
in his dissenting opinion, Justice White implies that he perceives
conversations to constitute searchable, seizable private property:
“Petitioner suggests that . . . the eavesdropper will overhear
conversations which do not relate to criminal activity. But the same is
true of almost all searches of private property which the Fourth
Amendment permits.” Id. at 108 (emphasis added). His observation is
significant because it conveys the assumption—radical at the time—that
oral words qualify as property. Elsewhere in his dissent, White remarks,
“[I]ndividual searches of private property through surreptitious
eavesdropping . . . must be carefully circumscribed to avoid excessive
invasion of privacy and security.” Id. This assumption directly
contradicts Justice Black’s position that, “by substituting the word
‘privacy’ for the language of the first clause of the [Fourth] Amendment,
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The framework linking expectations of privacy with
the third-party doctrine renders the Fourth Amendment
obsolete in a world functioning mostly through intangible
representations of reality. The fact that a digital
representation of the subject, any subject, exists suggests that
anything people do, anything they experience, anywhere
they go, and anything they possess that has been digitally
memorialized somewhere is—inherently—“shared.” If
everything that is our person is represented by the identity
we project along the “virtual highway,” then under the
privacy rubric, the Fourth Amendment offers no protection
from government surveillance in the information age.42 The
government can buy information from private eyes—or data
brokers just trying to earn a buck—just as easily as
marketing agents can.
the Court [has re-written and] expand[ed] the scope of the Amendment
to include oral conversations.” Berger, 388 U.S. at 86 (Black, J.,
dissenting). Fortunately, the Court integrated the content of intangible
communications into Fourth Amendment domain. However, Justice
Black’s scrutiny of the Court’s irreverent substitution of intact Fourth
Amendment language with “privacy” highlights the unraveling of
common law privacy.
42. See e.g., United States v. Dennis, No. 3:13-cr-10-TCB, 2014
WL 1908734, at *10 (N.D. Ga. May 12, 2014). “An internet subscriber does
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address or the
information he provides to his Internet Service Provider, such as
Comcast, in order to legally establish an internet connection.” Id.
(quoting United States v. Stanley, Criminal No. 11-272, 2012 WL 5512987,
at *12 (W.D.Pa. Nov. 14, 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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1. CONSTITUTIONAL ECHOES
The Katz inquiry probably constitutes the
underpinnings of nearly every judicial endorsement of
privacy-related mischief that has passed through the courts
since Katz was decided.43 In determining Google’s rights’ to
collect the plaintiffs’ internet search history, Delaware
District Court Judge Robinson cited a Katz-centric Fourth
Amendment holding by a New York district court that
declared “No expectation of privacy exists for . . . online
transactional information, such as a user’s Internet search
history.”44
When the Court considered business records in Smith
and Miller, it neglected to predict whether, one day, such
records would reflect people’s whereabouts at any given
moment in time. Today, in the course of conducting their
business, cellular service companies keep records of the
43. Justice Blackmun explains in Smith, “In determining
whether a particular form of government-initiated electronic surveillance
is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, our lodestar
is Katz v. United States.” 442 U.S. at 735. See also United States v. Davis, 785
F.3d 498, 507 (2015) (holding that, under the Katz test and its associated
principles, the government's obtaining access to MetroPCS's records did
not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
44. Google, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 444 (citing United States v.
Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). But see Riley, 134 S. Ct. at
2490 (where Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged a contrary position in a
2014 opinion that was heavily steeped in Katzlosophy: “An Internet
search and browsing history . . . could reveal an individual’s private
interests or concerns—perhaps a search for certain symptoms of disease,
coupled with frequent visits to WebMD.”).
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information consumers generate both intentionally and by
default just by using cellular service. Cellular technology
generates location information as a by-product of its
operation.45
[W]hen a cellular phone user makes a call, the
user’s cell phone sends a signal to a nearby cell
tower, which is typically . . . the closer tower to
the phone. . . . [A] cell tower would generally
have a coverage radius of about one to one-
and-a-half miles and . . . an individual cell
phone user could “be anywhere” in the
specified sector of a given cell tower’s range.46
Consumers wanting to conduct their affairs and
maintain their “persons, houses, papers, and effects” in time
with current social, political, and economic forces have few,
if any, “realistic alternative[s]”47 to contracting with cellular
service providers. Moreover, to keep pace with the rest of
the world, people carry their cell phones with them
everywhere they go.48
45. See Davis, 785 F.3d at 503.
46. Id. (referring to witness testimony by a custodian of
records from MetroPCS).
47. Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal
citations omitted).
48. As one journalist recently observed,
[T]he vast majority of us move around
each day with a live transmitter in our
pocket that constantly pings cell towers
without our knowledge. In my
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Last year, the Eleventh Circuit examined whether
“the Fourth Amendment precludes the government from
obtaining a third-party company’s business records showing
historical cell tower location information . . . without a
search warrant issued to that third party.”49 The panel
opinion, deviating from decisions in the Third and Fifth
commute to my office each day, an
approximately 20 mile journey, I likely
transverse multiple cell tower coverage
areas. I certainly do no [sic] know where
they start and stop, nor do I always use
my mobile phone during that commute.
. . . Without my knowing it, my device is
communicating with cell towers in
order to receive those notifications. I am
hardly disclosing my personal
whereabouts voluntarily to my service
provider in order to make that happen.
Simply put, we do not knowingly turn
over data to mobile telephone
companies in the same way as was
contemplated in Smith, where the
defendant made the conscious decision
to dial a phone number and a primitive
investigative tool captured that
volitional conduct.
Matthew S. Adams, The Great Cell Phone Tower Data Debate Bound to Hit
SCOTUS’ Docket Soon—Are We Living in George Orwell’s 1984?, THE E-
DISCOVERY STAGE (Jan. 2, 2015),
http://ediscoverystage.foxrothschild.com/2015/01/articles/metadata/t
he-great-cell-phone-location-data-debate/.
49. Davis, 785 F.3d at 505.
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Circuits, resounded in the affirmative.50 Upon rehearing,
however, the en banc court—in a split decision in which
three judges concurred and two dissented—took the safe
route, clinging tightly to Katz and its progeny. Judge Hull,
writing for the majority, held that court orders “compelling
the production of a third-party telephone company’s
business records containing historical cell tower
information” do not violate an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights.51 Since the records were created by a
third party; Davis neither owned nor possessed them; and
they “d[id] not contain private communications of the
subscriber,”52 he had no subjective or objective reasonable
expectation of privacy in them (and thus no legally-
cognizable interest in their protection).53
2. CONSTITUTIONAL MIRRORS: THE STATUTES
Beginning in 1986, as the intangible realm started
coming into focus, Congress passed the Stored
Communications Act and the Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act—its name says it all—of 1994, to
“fill constitutional gap[s] by protecting against unauthorized
access to electronic communications in third-party hands,
50. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014), reh’g
en banc granted, opinion vacated.
51. Davis, 785 F.3d at 500.
52. Id. at 512.
53. Id.
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e.g., internet service providers.”54 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit asserted, “The SCA was enacted because the advent
of the Internet presented a host of potential privacy breaches
that the Fourth Amendment does not address.”55 Like
prevailing Fourth Amendment models, the laws focus more
on individual privacy than on property.56 These statutes
generally withdraw protection if one of the parties having
54. Google, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 445. See also Quon v. Arch
Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008) (declaring, “The
SCA was enacted because the advent of the Internet presented a host of
potential privacy breaches that the Fourth Amendment does not
address.”).
55. Quon, 529 F.3at 900 (emphasis added) (citing Orin S.
Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV., 1208, 1209–13 (2004)). “The
SCA prevents ‘providers’ of communication services from divulging
private communications to certain entities and individuals.” Kerr, supra,
at 1213.
56. See e.g., Crispin v. Christian Aldigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d
965, 971 (C.D. Cal. 2010). The SCA “creates a set of Fourth Amendment-
like privacy protections by statute, regulating the relationship between
government investigators and service providers in possession of users’
private information.” Id. at 972 (quoting Orin S. Kerr, supra note 55, at
1212 (internal quotation marks omitted)). “First, the statute limits the
government’s right to compel providers to disclose information in their
possession about their customers and subscribers.” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §
2703 (2012)). “Although the Fourth Amendment may require no more
than a subpoena to obtain e-mails, the statute confers greater privacy
protection.” Id. (quoting Kerr, supra, note 55, at 1212–13) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Second, the statute limits the right of an
Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) to disclose information about
customers and subscribers to the government voluntarily.” Id. (citing 18
U.S.C. § 2702 (2012)).
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the information (most frequently, some “third party”
internet service provider) has promoted, consented to,
acquiesced in, or even itself engaged in, the “hijacking.” A
Washington district court recently reiterated that
“the sort of trespasses to which the Stored
Communications Act applies are those in
which the trespasser gains access to
information to which he is not entitled to see,
not those in which the trespasser uses the
information in an unauthorized way.”
. . .
[T]hough Plaintiff frequently invokes the
specter of Microsoft tracking users and crowd-
sourcing location data, the subsequent uses (or
misuses) of any data are not relevant
considerations under this provision, which is
concerned solely with unauthorized access.57
The “highjacking” this paper refers to, then, actually alludes
to the trespass (usually lawful, under the SCA) that enables
the under-regulated appropriation and conversion of
information by the party obtaining the information.
57. Cousineau v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp 3d 1167, 1171–72
(W.D. Wash. 2014) (quoting Educational Testing Serv. v. Stanley H. Kaplan
Educ. Ctr., 965 F. Supp. 731, 740 (D. Md. 1997)).
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3. MISAPPLYING FOURTH AMENDMENT
(MIS)JURISPRUDENCE
DoubleClick illustrates how the contours of the third-
party doctrine as applied in Miller emerge in modern
statutory commercial law.58 Because DoubleClick only
collected “information concerning users’ activities on
DoubleClick-affiliated Web sites,”59 the company’s surveillance
of the individual users’ activities was lawful. One of the
“parties,” the website, had consented to the surveillance. The
court analyzed the case under the SCA.60 The statute
“imposes liability on a person who ‘intentionally intercepts’
and discloses the ‘contents’ of an ‘electronic communication’
. . . unless ‘such person is a party to the communication or
where one of the parties to the communication has given
prior consent to such interception.’”61 Furthermore, it
contains an exception to the act’s general prohibition:
“Subsection (a) of this section does not apply with respect to
conduct authorized... (2) by a user of that [wire or electronic
58. See 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
59. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 504.
60. Id. at 507.
61. Google, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 445 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511
(2012)). “Since the Wiretap Act concerns the unauthorized interception of
electronic communication, the consent of one party is a complete defense
to a Wiretap Act claim.” In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1026
(2014) (citing Murray v. Fin. Visions, Inc., CV–07–2578–PHX–JM, 2008 WL
4850328, at *4 (D.Ariz. Nov. 7, 2008)).
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communications] service with respect to a communication of
or intended for that user.”62
Defining both human individuals as well as websites
as users under the Act,63 District Court Judge Buchwald
wrote, “Examining DoubleClick’s technological and
commercial relationships with its affiliated Web sites, we
find it implausible to infer that the Web sites have not
authorized DoubleClick’s access. . . . [T]he very reason client
[websites] hire DoubleClick is to target advertisements
based on users’ demographic profiles.”64 Thus, the
DoubleClick plaintiffs came up empty-handed when they
sued under the SCA, common law invasion of property, and
common law trespass to property. Neither could the
plaintiffs find retribution in the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (“CFAA”),65 which punishes “(a)-whoever. . . (2)(c)
intentionally accesses a computer without authorization, or
exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . .
62. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 507.
63. Id. at 509. But see iPhone, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1058 (citing
Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1161 (W.D. Wash. 2001)
(rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that under the SCA, personal computers
are “facilities through which an electronic communication service is
provided” for the very reason that such an assumption would mean that
web sites are users of the communication service, and “any
communication between the individual computer and the web site is a
communication ‘of or intended for’ that web site, triggering the §
2701(c)(2) exception for authorized access”). Id.
64. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 510.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
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information from any protected computer if the conduct
involved an interstate or foreign communication.”66 The
latter statute requires a $5000 damages threshold, which the
plaintiffs did not plead.
Considering that the SCA reflects Fourth Amendment
definitions of privacy, plaintiffs complaining of commercial
entities’ improper interference with their personal
information will find themselves circling endlessly through
an unsatisfying maze of third-party doctrine. While people
might intuit that a violation of their “selves” has occurred,
the law perceives no right of privacy in the personal
information gathered, engineered, and reproduced by other
entities to create their commodified “selves.” If the SCA was,
indeed, “enacted because the advent of the Internet
presented a host of potential privacy breaches that the
Fourth Amendment does not address,”67 then Congress
missed the mark. The statute inappropriately dresses Katz-
centric concepts in new clothes, emphasizing non-pertinent
issues (like “the computer” representing some phenomenal
new medium that requires its own fitting of third-party
doctrine) at the expense of critical considerations that
actually entail a theoretical overhaul in the law. Congress’s
modern solution starkly ignores how the commodification of
information creates new property interests; it fails—
miserably—to consider how the permeability of information
66. Id.
67. Quon, 529 F.3d at 900 (emphasis added) (citing Kerr,
supra note 55, at 1209–13. “The SCA prevents ‘providers’ of
communication services from divulging private communications to
certain entities and individuals.” Kerr, supra note 55, at 1213.
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necessitates evolution in the principles defining privacy
interests. Privacy interests in personal information are, as
privacy interests have always been, nearly inextricable from
their identification with the property interests that used to
protect them.
Under Congress’s regime, individuals’ privacy
interests lie defenseless under the tired—and confused—old
third-party doctrine. DoubleClick demonstrates how
Congress perpetuates the cycle of non-protection by
premising its legislation on idiosyncratic designs aimed to
protect against state action (not that they do) and ignoring
the manipulation such legislation promotes among private
entities. Moreover, the SCA actually uses the Court’s
theories regarding privacy to promote state action by
enabling a free-for-all whenever the two-faced “user” doing
business with the unwitting consumer “consents” to state
access.68
68. See United States v. Ackerman, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
89243, *10, *12 (D. Kan. 2014) (quoting United States v. Benoit, 713 F.3d 1, 9
(10th Cir. 2013) (stating, “The Fourth Amendment is ‘wholly inapplicable
to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private
individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the
participation or knowledge of any governmental official.’”). Fourth
Amendment privacy constructions and the SCA neatly withdraw
protection of personal information once a person has granted initial
access to the information to another entity. From a property perspective,
the information is now the property of the party who accessed it for its
own use (with the subject’s consent), and he can do whatever he wants
with it. As Miller and Smith demonstrate, this careful renunciation of
protection by the courts dissolves privacy interests by enabling a
property right in the collected information.
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B. COMMON LAW PRIVACY AND TORT LAW: THE RIGHT
TO DISSEMINATE
On Inside Man, Spurlock explains that companies’
right to share our information and internet activity is
embedded in the service agreements we agree to “every time
[we] buy or sign up for something,” and each time we check
the box indicating our agreement to the site’s terms—usually
the only way to move to the next page on a website site—we
opt in.69 “Every time [we] visit a website, put an item in
[our] shopping cart, or like a friend’s status, data
aggregators are collecting that information. They send it out
to marketing companies who bid against each other to show
[us] a targeted ad.”70 Ramdam tells Spurlock that data
brokerage companies, called “lifestyle companies,” start
gathering information on us when “[our] mother[s] are
pregnant with [us]. They buy every single motor vehicle
registration . . . every voter registration . . . property
record.”71 They even collect the names of “every book [we]
buy [and] every movie [we] watch.”72
No doubt, prudent consumers weigh their interests
(like time and privacy) each time they face a service
agreement. After weighing their interests, they decide that
whatever piece of information they are giving up in that
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transaction, whether a book title, search query, or cosmetic
purchase, won’t be missed. What any person can guess
about another’s identity based on a single purchase amounts
to nothing more than a guess. However, that piece of
information represents one dot in a “gigantic trove of
data,”73 holding—for each piece of information we
knowingly, willingly give up—“five other things that [we]
didn’t know . . . [we] gave up.”74 Data collectors compile our
clicks, our purchases, our likes, and our registrations; they
synthesize and interpret them. Their work product then
becomes a valuable commodity they own and lawfully
possess the right to trade.
1. DEFINITIONS OF PRIVACY
In Reporter’s Committee, Justice Stevens meanders
from Fourth Amendment bases of privacy in a deliberate
and focused discussion of common law privacy. His clear
delineation of common law standards implies two important
points. First, theoretically, the common law recognizes and
protects a broader range of personal information than the
Fourth Amendment protects.
To begin with, both the common law and the
literal understandings of privacy encompass
the individual's control of information
concerning his or her person. In an organized
society, there are few facts that are not at one
73. Heath, supra note 6.
74. Id.
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time or another divulged to another. Thus the
extent of the protection accorded a privacy
right at common law rested in part on the
degree of dissemination of the allegedly
private fact and the extent to which the
passage of time rendered it private. According
to Webster's initial definition, information may
be classified as "private" if it is "intended for or
restricted to the use of a particular person or
group or class of persons: not freely available
to the public."75
Second, while the Fourth Amendment might allow
government access to certain kinds of information, common
law rules of privacy steer the government’s disclosure of
whatever information it gathers. Justice Stevens carefully
adds in a footnote, however, that “[t]he question of the
statutory meaning of privacy under the FOIA is, of course,
not the same as the question whether a tort action might lie
for invasion of privacy.”76 Therefore, though the Court
refuses to compel the FBI to share its compilation of criminal
histories under the Freedom of Information Act (because to
do so would invade citizens’ privacy), the Court declines to
pronounce whether a tort would lie over such sharing.
However, the fact that the Court makes its findings based on
common law tort theory indicates that plaintiffs suing under
the same theory have strong support for their position that
75. Id.
76. Id. at 762n.2.
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commercial distribution of their personal information
constitutes an invasion of their privacy.
The stark absence of third-party doctrine in Justice
Steven’s discussion of privacy definitions in Reporter’s
Committee 77 implies the Court’s deliberate attempt to
maintain a distinction between common law privacy and
whatever type of privacy the Court perceives is inherently
protected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court’s
compulsory use of the chameleonic balancing test reinforces
the notion that privacy is an abstraction, incapable of precise
definition or boundaries and measurable only in relative
increments.78 The substantive content at issue in the case—
compiled records of “sensitive” information about private
citizens—the sensitivity of which Justice Stevens emphasizes
throughout the opinion, should not distract from the fact
that the Court enforces protection of these records from
public access in the name of “personal privacy” as the
common law defines it.
2. COMPILATIONS LEAD TO GREATER INVASION
On Inside Man, Morgan Spurlock warns, “Your data
starts out as just a bunch of ones and zeroes, and shouldn’t .
. . be traced back to you, but the more it’s collected and
77. See Reporter’s Committee, 489 U.S. at 763–64.
78. See id. at 762. “Exemption 7(C) requires us to balance the
privacy interest in maintaining, as the Government puts it, the "practical
obscurity" of the rap sheets against the public interest in their release.”
(citing 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(7)(C)).
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collated, the easier it is for someone with the right tools to
put it all back together.”79 Similarly, Justice Stevens
characterizes the information at issue in Reporter’s Committee
as sensitive because it has been aggregated. Justice Stevens
moreover references the Court’s thinking in Whalen v. Roe80
that "the State of New York may record, in a centralized
computer file, the names and addresses of all persons who
have obtained, pursuant to a doctor's prescription, certain
drugs for which there is both a lawful and an unlawful
market” because “the Federal Constitution does not prohibit
such a compilation.”81 However, Justice Stevens remarks,
“we recognize[] that such a centralized computer file pose[s]
a "threat to privacy."82
This remark is notable because Reporter’s Committee
implicated the Freedom of Information Act; it had nothing to
do with the Fourth Amendment. Justice Stevens’s focus on
traditional privacy definitions highlights the philosophical
irony arising in cases that do implicate issues of government
trespass and taking. In Fourth Amendment cases, the Court
conjures definitions of privacy that are diametrically
opposite to traditional common law (and Webster’s)83; the
79. Spurlock, supra note 1. See also Heath, supra note 6 (noting
that “[r]elatively minor pieces of information, added together, become
greater than the sums of their parts”).
80. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
81. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977).
82. Id.
83. The contrast in the Court’s allowances of privacy
different contexts can be illustrated by comparing Miller, 425 U.S. at 443,
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Court’s choices in this regard promote, rather than
challenge, law enforcement agencies’ access to personal
information about private citizens. This relationship
indicates the delusion—apparently held by both Congress
and the Supreme Court of the United States, that Americans
can rest secure: the government can access (and keeps
careful records of) our secrets, but it will keep those secrets
safe so we can maintain our reputations within our
communities.
Under the balancing test promulgated in Reporter’s
Committee, some situations might prompt courts to enforce
disclosure of governmental records where “the public
interest” in such disclosure outweighs “personal privacy.”
Reporter’s Committee might be “quaint” because Americans
today have few expectations of privacy in compiled rap
sheets; its foreboding arises from the practically limitless
range of “personal information” precariously “kept” by
in which the Court states “This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a
third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed,” with Reporter’s Committee, 489 U.S. at 767, where Justice
Stevens notes, “[O]ur cases have also recognized the privacy interest
inherent in the nondisclosure of certain information even where the
information may have been at one time public.” While public
information is not exactly analogous to information “revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose,” the deviation
only further underscores the radical difference in what the Court deems
to be a legitimate expectation of privacy.
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government officials, who might be compelled to disclose
that information in the public interest.
If not for Katz, the “lodestar,”84 the government
would have little access (without due process) to people’s
personal information. If not for the shapeshifting conception
of privacy espoused in Katz, Miller, and Smith, the SCA
might afford consumers some property rights against
intangible trespass. Now they stand defenseless against their
merchants, who clear paths into consumers’ lives with
boilerplate consent agreements and cookies and then sell
their findings to information brokers. However, a closer
inspection suggests that Reporter’s Committee—unlike
numerous district court holdings discussed in this paper—
justifies an appropriation action for the unauthorized sale of
commodified personal data because the data is bound for
compilation and systematization. If the sale of the “ones and
zeros” alone cannot give rise to such an action, then the sale
of the compilation itself should give rise to the action.
84. Justice Blackmun explains in Smith, “In determining
whether a particular form of government-initiated electronic surveillance
is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, our lodestar
is Katz v. United States.” 442 U.S. at 735. See also Davis, 785 F.3d at 507
(holding that the government's obtaining access to MetroPCS's records
did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment).
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C. PRIVACY, IDENTITY, AND AUTONOMY
The distinction between identity as a product of
creation—built through the gathering and aggregation of
various pieces of information about an individual—and
identity as an ever-in-flux, incidentally-manifested by-
product of living, is as subtle and difficult to pin down as the
distinction between energy and subatomic matter (where
bits of matter are so tiny and moving so fast, they are
virtually indistinguishable from the energy that creates
them). Information belongs to no one until someone decides
to detach from the experience that creates it and begin
collecting, arranging, and bottling and labeling it for trade.
The law enables a property right to information in the entity
that converts the information, though it backs into the enabling
by denying that an expectation of privacy can exist shared
information. Since personal information is not protected by
privacy law, it should qualify as converted the moment it is
generated and used (by some entity other than the subject
whom it concerns) for any purpose other than identification.
The property-privacy conundrum manifests in the
gray area where experience becomes recorded and begs the
question: to whom does the experience then belong? Surely,
the law must recognize that once a person becomes bound
by his every movement, action, and thought, his liberty of
person is at stake. Legal scholar and professor Paul Schwartz
appropriately tethers the myriad platitudes referencing
Orwell’s 1984 to this discrete concept, quoting from the
novel, “There was of course no way of knowing whether
you were being watched at any given moment. . . . You had
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to live—and did live, from habit that became instinct—in the
assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and,
except in darkness, every moment scrutinized.”85
The position advanced in this paper relies on two
assumptions, the most critical being that individual
autonomy is the basic unifying policy of our nation. This
policy manifests in the organizational structure of our social,
political, and economic systems and functionally informs
our legal tradition.86 The second assumption is that honoring
individual autonomy is a central goal of our legal system.87
85. Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2055, 2073 (2004) (quoting George Orwell, 1984 6–7 (1949)).
86. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2635 (2015)
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas quotes from a 1756 editorial in
the Boston Gazette to show how John Locke’s philosophies on civil liberty
“permeated the 18th-century political scene in America: “‘Liberty in the
State of Nature’ was the ‘inherent natural Right’ ‘of each Man’ ‘ to make
a free Use of his Reason and Understanding, and to chuse that Action
which he thinks he can give the best Account of,’ but that, ‘in Society,
every Man parts with a Small Share of his natural Liberty, . . . that he
may possess the Remainder without Controul.’” (quoting Boston Gazette
and Country Journal, No. 58, May 10, 1756, p. 1). Justice Thomas further
discusses the likely meaning of “civil liberty” from the founding fathers’
perspective. “When the colonists described laws that would infringe
their liberties, they discussed laws that would prohibit individuals ‘from
walking in the streets and highways on certain saints days, or from being
abroad after a certain time in the evening, or restrain [them] from
working up and manufacturing materials of [their] own growth.’” Id.
(quoting Downer, A Discourse at the Dedication of the Tree of Liberty, in 1 C.
Hyneman & D. Lutz, American Political Writing During the Founding Era
1760-1805 101 (1983). In this case, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,
emphasizes throughout his lament that, as used in the Due Process
clauses, “liberty most likely refers to the power of locomotion, of
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1. THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE
The threat of personal injury imposed by the
information market extends beyond the superficial,
defamation-based interferences discussed in Warren and
Brandeis’s Right to Privacy because the modern virtual
persona constitutes a utilitarian duplicate of the physical
person. In Stanley v. Georgia, the Court observed,
changing situation, or removing one’s person to whatsoever place one’s
own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint.” Id. at
2632 (quoting 1 W. Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
130 (1769). Justices Thomas and Scalia urge that such freedom pertains to
the physical person.
87. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593. (opening with, “The
Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that
includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm,
to define and express their identity.” But see id. at 2615–16 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting): “[T]he majority’s approach has no basis in principle or
tradition, except for the unprincipled tradition of judicial policymaking
that characterized discredited decisions such as Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45.” This paper interprets the referenced debate in Obergefell to focus
not on the ideological tradition of autonomy in America, but on whether
the Court has the constitutional authority to define and enforce it
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
paper relies not on the majority’s approach nor reasoning to support the
majority’s position that the Court is authorized to decide such issues;
rather, this paper references the case to illustrate how one branch of our
legal system incorporates personal autonomy considerations, even from a
policy standpoint, to make decisions regarding constitutional law.
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[The defendant] is asserting the right to read or
observe what he pleases-the right to satisfy his
intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy
of his own home.... If the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own
house, what books he may read or what films
he may watch. Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men's
minds.88
Unbridled surveillance by private entities records every
movement the virtual persona makes. The fact that the
private actor conducting the surveillance has the power to
distribute the fruits of his labors however he pleases
(including to government officials) does give the
government the ability to “control men’s minds” because
“[t]he use, transfer, or processing of personal data by public
and private sector organizations will affect the choices that
we make.”89 Without property lines in the virtual world, the
fact that a man is sitting alone in his own house affords him
little protection from surveillance, investigation, or public
scrutiny.
88. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564–66 (1969).
89. Paul Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2058 (2004).
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[P]roperty and privacy are each grounded in
territorial metaphors which construct
boundaries that define realms of physical or
social immunity from state interference.
Property rights confer a certain amount of
spatial sovereignty in the property owned,90 a
factor which directly complements the right to
be left alone. This is why the Supreme Court,
at various points, has emphasized that ‘one
who owns or lawfully possesses or controls
property will in all likelihood have a legitimate
expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to
exclude.’91
Further, our choices create our experience. Just knowing that
our movements are tracked restricts our liberty to develop
and express our own selves.
Constitutional and common law analyses perpetually
approach identity “interference” through the lens of privacy
interests under the decisional autonomy prong of the
privacy rubric in constitutional law92 and under tort actions
90. Katyal, supra note 32, at 235 (citing Sadhika Rao,
Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 425 (2000)).
91. Id. (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12
(1978)).
92. In 1977, the Court delineated another class of privacy
interests, “based upon a substantive concept of personal liberty . . . found
in the Fourteenth Amendment,” Shields v. Burger, 874 F.2d 1201, 1210 (7th
Cir. 1989) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)), which differs
connotatively from the confidentiality interests that have been practically
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like appropriation, intrusion on privacy, rights of publicity,
and defamation in common law. Despite the substantive
distinctions courts make regarding decisional autonomy,93
the existence of an underlying policy that recognizes a
fundamental right to such autonomy denotes the recognition
that a person’s ability to navigate his own ship, at least with
regard to certain decisions,94 is implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.95
obliterated by the third-party doctrine. This class represents “the interest
in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”92
93. See Shields v. Burger, 874 F.2d 1201, 1209–10 (7th Cir.
1989) (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 713. Generally, the kinds of “important
decisions” that qualify for protected autonomy regard “family-related
matters, including marriage, procreation, abortion, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education.”
94. “The focus of decisional privacy is on freedom from
interference when one makes certain fundamental decisions . . .
[I]nformation privacy is concerned with the use, transfer, and processing
of the personal data generated in daily life.” See Schwartz, supra note 88,
at 2058.
95. See id. at 2087. Here, Schwartz notes,
[P]rivacy is necessary for both
“individual self-determination” and
“democratic deliberation.” Based in part
on civic republicanism, this conception
views democracy as dependent on
common participatory activities,
reciprocal respect, and the need for
consensus about political issues. To
borrow a phrase from Robert Post, the
process at stake is the “creation of the
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2. MOVEMENT AND AUTONOMY
Granted, whether intangible forces can inhibit liberty
of movement is debatable. As Justice Thomas, joined by
Justice Scalia, recently lamented in Obergefell v. Hodges,96 the
“Court appears to lost its way” in construing the Framers’
formulation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment:
When read in light of the history of [the]
formulation, it is hard to see how the “liberty”
protected by the Clause could be interpreted to
include anything broader than freedom from
physical restraint. That was the consistent
usage of the time when “liberty” was paired
with “life” and “property.” And that usage
avoids rendering superfluous those protections
for “life” and “property.” . . . That the Court
appears to have lost its way in . . . recent years
does not justify deviating from the original
meaning of the Clause[].97
autonomous self required by democratic
citizenship.” In this conception,
deliberative democracy requires limits
on access to personal information
because Americans will hesitate to
engage in democratic self-rule should
widespread and secret surveillance
become the norm.
96. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2633 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 24142
Significantly, Justice Thomas stresses that “liberty most
likely refers to the power of locomotion, of changing
situation, or removing one’s person to whatsoever place
one’s own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or
restraint.”98
The law must regard the identity a person uses online
as his “person,” deserving the same privileges, protections,
and entitlements his physical person deserves. In Hiibel v.
Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nevada, Humboldt County, et al,99
three justices revived the Court’s acknowledgement in Terry
v. Ohio100 that “the Fourth Amendment protects the ‘right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own
person.’”101 As one writer observes, “Lockean notions of
property in one’s person are inextricably linked to the
protection of privacy. Because they presuppose the ability to
exclude others from bodily invasion, they suggest that
protection of bodily privacy also involves a metaphor of
ownership.”102 Modern, legal conceptions of identity must
regard it as a product, an autonomous “agent,” really, of the
98. Id. at 2632 (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 130 (1769)).
99. 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
100. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
101. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 197 (Breyer, Souter, and Ginsberg, JJs.,
dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)).
102. Katyal, supra note 32, at 233 (citing Radhika Rao,
Property, Policy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 422 (2000)).
2016 DISPOSING WITH A (NOT-SO) BLUNT INSTRUMENT 143
physical body, which people build, assimilate, and use very
practically to conduct their business.
III. A ROOM OF ONE’S OWN
Before Katz, the zone of privacy—within which,
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, an individual is said to
be protected from governmental investigative activities103—
used to have clear and objectively-discernible boundaries
represented by the structures of private property. For
example, dwellings create privacy by literally shielding
individuals from the world.104 People used to enjoy privacy
103. See id. at 440. “‘No interest legitimately protected by the
Fourth Amendment’ is implicated by governmental investigative
activities unless there is an intrusion into a zone of privacy, into ‘the
security a man relies upon when he places himself or his property within
a constitutionally protected area.’” Id. (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 301–02 (1966)).
104. See Katyal, supra note 32, at 235 (quoting HANNA
ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958)) (observing that
the four walls of one’s private property
offer the only reliable hiding place from
the common public world, not only
from everything that goes on in it but
also from its very publicity, from being
seen and being heard. A life spent
entirely in public, in the presence of
others, becomes, as we would say,
shallow. While it retains visibility, it
loses the quality of rising into sight from
some darker ground which must remain
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within such zones because there was no “eye in the sky” that
literally created records reflecting every movement they
made.
Under Katz, people today have to ditch a whole lot of
property, including their credit and debit cards, their
phones, their computers, and even their cars, before they can
rest safely within some conceptual realm resembling a zone
of privacy, even when that “zone” is their dwelling.
A. INTANGIBLE PROPERTY
The labor theory of value, as posited by Adam Smith,
defines “[t]he real price of every thing . . . [as] the toil and
trouble of acquiring it. What everything is really worth to
the man who has acquired it.”105 Hence, the Court in
Reporter’s Committee could, perhaps, in 1989, conceive of the
government’s framing a limitation like “practical obscurity”
to the exploitation of personal information. Though Justice
Stevens framed the issue through the language of privacy,
the compilation of information the reporter sought in the
case did represent property, property of the FBI.
hidden if it is not to lose its depth in a
very real, non-subjective sense.).
105. ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS Book 1, chapter V
(1776).
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1. INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE V. ASSOCIATED PRESS
Since at least as early as 1918, the Court has
recognized an intangible property right in business
enterprises related to the collection, organization, and
dissemination of information. For purposes of this
argument, property is defined by its capacity for “exclusion
by law from interference.”106 The tension between Justice
Pitney’s 1918 majority opinion and Justice Holmes’s
dissenting opinion in International News Service v. Associated
Press107 forecasts the difficulties bound to arise when
present-day courts try to apply industrial-age rationale to
problems emerging in an era where personal information is
the hottest commodity on the market. Justice Pitney wrote,
“[N]ews matter, however little susceptible of ownership or
dominion in the absolute sense, is stock in trade, to be gathered
at the cost of enterprise, organization, skill, labor, and
money, and to be distributed and sold to those who will pay
money for it.”108
Justice Holmes—observing that shared information is
always susceptible to interference—countered that
“[p]roperty, a creation of law, does not arise from value,
although exchangeable. . . . Property depends upon
exclusion by law from interference.”109 The majority’s
106. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,
246 (1918) Holmes, J., dissenting).
107. 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918).
108. International News, 248 U.S. at 236.
109. Id. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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reasoning specifically implied, however, that the property
interest at issue in International News encompassed more
than information; the business enterprise itself constituted
the property with which the defendant had no right to
interfere.110 “The process [by which the defendant profited
from the plaintiff’s work] amounts to an unauthorized
interference with the normal operation of complainant’s
legitimate business precisely at the point where the profit is
to be reaped.”111 Justice Pitney’s statements do not contradict
Justice Holmes’s perspective that exclusion from
interference—rather than value—defines property interests,
but his emphasis on the profit-bearing enterprise suggests
that some economic value is necessarily implicated in the
intangible-property rights analysis.
2. APPLYING THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE MODEL
Nearly seventy years after International News, Justice
White, writing for an unanimous Court in Carpenter v. United
States,112 added to International News’s business enterprise
model by holding that “[a newspaper’s] interest in the
confidentiality of the contents and timing of [its] . . . column
[was] a property right.”113 Here, the Court examined
110. See International News, 248 U.S. at 240 (1918).
111. Id.
112. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
113 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (internal
citations and quotations omitted) (italics added for emphasis).
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whether the writer of an influential stocks and bonds
column, who conspiratorially leaked the contents of next
day’s column to turn a quick profit, committed statutory
fraud against the paper. Carpenter contended his activities
landed outside the statutory restrictions because “the
newspaper [was] the only alleged victim of fraud and ha[d]
no interest in the securities traded.”114 Echoing Pitney’s and
Holmes’s discourse in International News, Justice White
explained that property deprivation doesn’t necessarily
equate to monetary loss; the property interest Carpenter
wiled the newspaper out of was exclusivity.115
Justice Pitney distinguished in International News
between authorized and unauthorized use of information;
the defendant’s use of the information for profit constituted
the unauthorized interference with the complainant’s
business enterprise. The business enterprise model serves
few people demanding legal rights to their personal
information today; unless someone is a celebrity or person of
public interest, his personal information lacks economic
value in his own “hands,” and it thus has little legal
114. Id. at 25.
115. See id. at 26–27. Cf. United States v. Sadler, 750 F.3d 585,
591 (2014) (noting that Carpenter “stopped [the] expanding universe of
intangible-right protections, limiting the fraud statutes’ scope to rights
that sounded in property”). This opinion implies that property must
have some sort of pecuniary value to be protected by the fraud statute.
Juxtaposed with Sadler, Carpenter could be read to suggest that the
confidentiality and timing of the column, as well as “confidential business
information,” see Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26, due to its relationship to the
business enterprise, actually does have monetary value (as it represents
an income-generating asset).
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protection as a form of property.116 The Second Circuit has
acknowledged that under New York law, “an action for
conversion will not normally lie over intangible property.”117
Under the exception to this rule, “documents that embody
an intangible right, like stock certificates . . . may be the
subject of conversion.”118 Case law involving the right of
publicity,119 appropriation,120 and fraud121 also reveals this
premise.
116. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). Here,
the Court emphasizes the protection of property rights over other
intangible rights and, according to Justice Ginsburg, lays to rest
prosecutions against defrauders who “deprived victims of ‘intangible
rights’ unrelated to money or property.” The Court moreover
emphasizes a distinction between intangible “interests” that may have
been protected by the mail fraud statute before McNally and those that
Congress aimed to protect when McNally had appeared to preclude
protection of intangible, non-economic interests.
117. Thyroff v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 460 F.3d 400,
405 (2d Cir. 2006).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d
866 (2d Cir. 1953). The Haelen court observed, “[I]t is common
knowledge that many prominent persons . . . , far from having their
feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel
sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing [the
use of their personae in advertising].” Id. at 868. “The right of publicity is
limited to situations involving the taking of the ‘commercial value’ of a
person's identity. . . . It is wielded almost exclusively by celebrities as a
way to control their right to profit from their fame.” Andrew J. McClurg,
A Thousand Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer
Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 107 (2003). McClurg emphasizes
throughout his article that appropriation is a privacy tort and should be
analyzed distinctly from the right of publicity. See id.
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120. In Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995), the court “dismissed an appropriation claim, ‘finding
that the plaintiffs had failed to show an appropriation because a single,
random cardholder’s name has little or no intrinsic value.’ Rather, the
value attached to the name derived from the aggregation and analysis of
the data conducted by American Express.” Ludington, supra note 11. See
also McClurg, supra note 118.
Unfortunately, too many courts . . . have lost
sight of the distinction between [appropriation
and the right of publicity]. Courts] stew them
together in radically under-analyzed opinions
that, . . . because almost all the relevant cases are
brought by celebrities, exalt the property-based
right of publicity interest over the personal
privacy interest the appropriation tort was
created to protect. The result is that
appropriation is being obscured to the point of
possible extinction.
Id.
121. See Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19 (holding that ”it is sufficient
that the [Wall Street] Journal has been deprived of its right to exclusive
use of the [stock trade] information, for exclusivity is an important
aspect of confidential business information and most private property”).
In reaching its holding, the Carpenter Court references Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001–04, where the Court had observed,
“Confidential business information has long been recognized as
property.” Id. See also Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 22 (2000)
(holding that the defendant did not violate the federal wire fraud statute
when lying on his poker game license application because, even
assuming poker game licenses were characterized as property in the
hands of the state (a position the Court did not support), “the nature of
that property [could not] be economic”). Justice Ginsburg writes, “State
municipal licenses in general, and Louisiana’s video poker licenses in
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Virtual “persons . . . papers and effects” cannot be
trespassed122 and stolen in such a way as to deprive a person
of his property rights.123 Hence, courts rarely find the
particular, we hold, do not rank as ‘property’ for purposes of § 1341, in
the hands of the official licensor.” Id. That an object has the capacity to
“rank” implies its capacity to represent value. This paper argues that, in
the Court’s perspective, the value represented by the object’s “rank” is its
economic value. Once an object has the capacity for economic value, it
“ranks” as property.
122. See Dennis, No. 3:13-cr-10-TCB, 2014 WL 1908734, at *9.
(“Because ‘[t]his investigation involve[d] the transmission of electronic
signals without trespass,’ it did not ‘implicate [the defendant’s] Fourth
Amendment rights under Jones.’”) (quoting United States v. Bashear,
Criminal No. 4:11-CR-0062, 2013 WL 6065326, at *3 (M.D.Pa. Nov. 18,
2013)). See also Katyal, supra note 32, at 233. “[I]n real space, property
rights coupled with architecture serve as a defensive shield to protect
privacy. In contrast, . . . the nature of cyberspace couples the relationship
between property and privacy, creating a host of challenges for the
protection of privacy. Unlike real space, which is reified boundaries
between private and public space, boundaries in digital space are largely
permeable and transparent, engendering a nearly limitless potential for
consumer surveillance.” Id.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 517– 18
(2010) (quoting Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119
HARV. L.REV. 531, 584–85 (2005)):
For most of its first two centuries, the
Fourth Amendment was used almost
exclusively to regulate government
searches of homes and containers. The
mechanisms of home and container
searches directed Fourth Amendment
doctrine to focus primarily on the
entrance to the home or container. In a
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damages required for a plaintiff to have standing124 and
bring action against the alleged thief. However, if the theft of
such virtual “persons . . . papers and effects” leads to a loss
of property rights in something like money (as when a credit
card might be stolen), such damages could be relied on to
bring a cause of action for trespass.125
world of physical barriers, actions that
broke down those physical barriers
became the focus of judicial attention.
The world of digital search and seizure
shows that this focus is contingent on
the architecture of physical searches. As
computer searches and seizures become
more common in the future, we will
begin to see twentieth-century Fourth
Amendment doctrine as a contingent set
of rules that achieves the foundational
goals of the Fourth Amendment law
given the dynamics of searching
physical property. Those physical rules
will be matched by a set of rules for
digital searches and seizures that
attempts to achieve the same purpose in
a very different factual context.
124. See, e.g., DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 523 (remarking,
“The facts . . . illustrate[] the difference between ‘loss’ and ‘damage’—
there was no ‘damage’ to the function of [the computer] system or the
data within it, only plaintiff’s ‘loss’ from defendant’s trespass.”).
“Nonetheless, the court required a finding that [the plaintiff’s] losses
exceeded the ‘$5,000 statutory threshold requirement’ before it granted
summary judgment.” Id. (citing America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, 46 F. Supp.
2d 444, 450 (E.D. Va. 1998)).
125. See, e.g., Thyroff, 460 F.3d at 405 (holding that under New
York law, “an action for conversion will not normally lie over intangible
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B. DEFINING OWNERSHIP
Oxford’s proposal that information, “[c]ontrasted
with data[, is] that which is obtained by the processing of
data”126 implies that the existence of information depends on
its being produced. The majority in International News
critiqued the defendant’s stance that information not
contained “becomes the common possession of all to whom
it is accessible; and . . . [anyone who gains knowledge of it]
has the right to communicate [it] to anybody and for any
purpose, even for the purpose of selling it for profit”127 by
distinguishing among the purposes of the communication.
“The right of the purchaser of a single newspaper to spread
knowledge of its contents gratuitously, for any legitimate
purpose not unreasonably interfering with complainant’s
right to make merchandise of it, may be admitted; but to
transmit that news for commercial use, in competition with
property.” The exception to the rule, the court recognized, is that
“documents that embody an intangible right, like stock certificates . . .
may be the subject of conversion”); Del Vecchio, No. 11-366, 2012 WL
1997697 (finding “plaintiffs alleged sufficient injury to have standing
when they alleged the dissemination and use of personal information
belonging to them, including sensitive information about their web
browsing and shopping habits, purchases, and related transaction
information, combined with their financial information such as credit
and debit card information, and their mailing and billing addresses.”).
126. See OED, supra note 8.
127. International News, 248 U.S. at 239.
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complainant—which is what defendant has done and seeks
to justify—is a very different matter.” This distinction
further suggests that intangible property rights must
correspond with the business enterprise model; this paper
attempts to extend the business enterprise model by tying an
individual’s personal information with his ability support
his own livelihood. While the individual’s use of his own
information does not always translate to a commercial
enterprise, every commercial enterprise he endeavors to
undertake implicates his personal information, and when
that information has been tampered with, his commercial
undertakings are hindered.
1. THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO PROFIT
Under current judicial constructions, information
generally belongs to the individual who “produces” it,128 so
consumers trying to sue information-traders on property
grounds have consistently struck out. For example, where
iPhone customers sued Apple for conversion of personal
information (among other things), District Court Judge Koh
complained the plaintiffs “failed to establish that the broad
category of information referred to as ‘personal information’
128. See Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual
Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1, 17 (1996). “The consequence of the increased institutional
need for information made its possession the determining factor in the
right to use the information. With few exceptions, the individual’s ability
to prevent collection and disclosure of the information ended once the
information was in the hands of a third party.” Id.
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is an interest capable of precise definition.” 129 In contrast to
the observations Justice Stevens presented in Reporter’s
Committee, Judge Koh maintained, “Moreover, it is difficult
to see how this broad category of information is capable of
exclusive possession or control.”130
International News indicates, however, that while
information may not be capable of exclusive possession, an
individual maintains property rights to information by
lawfully controlling how the information will be
disseminated: “Defendant insists that . . . by issuing [the
news] to newspapers and distributing it indiscriminately,
complainant no longer has the right to control the use to be
made of it. . . . The fault in the reasoning lies in applying as a
test the right of the complainant as against the public,
instead of considering the rights of complainant and
defendant, competitors in business, as between
themselves.”131 This statement suggests that the law
recognizes exclusive control of information by recognizing
the exclusive right to profit commercially by its publication.
Thus, the law comprehends that the primary incentive for
producing information is profit, so the fact that information
is incapable of exclusive possession does not impede its
potential to classify as property.
In Google, the court dismissed four counts in a class
action against Google, where Google had collected users’
personally-identifiable information to later trade and sell
129. iPhone, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
130. Id.
131. International News, 248 U.S. at 239–40.
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that information. Here, the plaintiffs cited numerous articles
supporting their assertion that personal information is a
valuable commodity.132 The court found the plaintiffs
lacking Article III standing133 to bring the case: “[W]hile the
plaintiffs . . . offered some evidence that the online personal
information . . . has some modicum of identifiable value to
[themselves], [they] have not sufficiently alleged that the
ability to monetize their [PII] has been diminished or lost by
virtue of Google’s previous collection of it.”134 Conversely, in
Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc.,135 a district court in
Washington found the plaintiffs’ allegations of Amazon’s
“dissemination and use of personal information belonging to
[the plaintiffs], including sensitive information about their
web browsing and shopping habits, purchases, and related
transaction information, combined with their financial
information such as credit and debit card information, and
their mailing and billing addresses”136 sufficient for the
plaintiffs to have standing.
132. Google, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 441.
133. Id at 440. “Article III standing requires: (1) an injury-in-
fact . . . ; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of; and (3) that it must be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id.
134. Id.
135. No. 11-366, 2012 WL 1997697 (W.D. Wash. June 1, 2012)
136. Del Vecchio, No. 11-366, 2012 WL 1997697 *2).
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2. BALANCING PRIVACY AND PROPERTY
The intrinsic problem for property analyses in these
cases is that people don’t necessarily want to publish,
produce, or disseminate all the information that is generated
about them—even for a profit—so data brokers are not
competing in business with the individuals whose
information they produce. Plaintiffs cannot, then, rely on
International News to support their cause. This explains why
privacy cases, including Reporter’s Committee, rely on the
balancing test when comparing a plaintiff’s “interest” in
keeping his information private with a commercial entity’s
“interest” in publishing the information.137 Within this
framework, for the commercial entity, property equals the
market value of the information, but for the individual,
property equals privacy. Courts cannot compare apples to
oranges, and monetary damages drive civil law, so the
plaintiffs lose unless they can put a price on their identity—
and not only their identity, but the misrepresentation of their
identity. To discourage mass surveillance and information
trade, the law must remove the profit incentive, either with
punitive damages or criminal fines.
137. This argument acknowledges that the FBI in Reporter’s
Committee had no commercial interest in disseminating its records of
individuals’ criminal history records and that privacy, not property, was
at issue in that case. However, because the individuals’ privacy was
implicated, the Court had to use the balancing test, which this paper
attempts to elucidate.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Privacy laws provide insufficient protection of
personal information for two reasons. First, regardless of the
Stored Communications Act being introduced as serving to
fill constitutional gaps created by the internet, the act
ultimately regulates activity by private actors, and it
incorporates ill-suited, misguided Fourth Amendment
standards to do so. The act focuses on information access
and surveillance, and it fails to address the implications
arising from third parties’ dissemination of the information
they access. While the law purports to limit government
officials’ access to information conveyed to technological
service providers, it gives providers broad dominion over
whatever information they acquire. Second, common law
tort theories rely on measurable damages, and the
intangible, abstract nature of the identity lacks a clear
formula for quantification. Until the law regards the identity
as either the person or property of the individual whom it
concerns, and as long as the law refuses to protect “shared”
information, the public outcry for greater privacy protection
will remain futile.
By shifting its focus to the enterprise at issue in
International News, and recognizing that the individual
requires autonomy over his identity to conduct the enterprise
of living and being in the modern world, the law could
restrict information appropriation to the extent that it
interferes with the individual’s necessary use of his own
identity.
